



K&L GATES

# The 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games: Insights on Olympic Infrastructure Delivery

July 2025



## Executive Summary

The Queensland Government is uniquely positioned to deliver world-class infrastructure for the 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games (2032 Games). This paper identifies three global insights from past Olympic Games that inform this opportunity.

### Key Insights

#### **Queensland Can Lead Globally by Applying Lessons from Past Olympic Infrastructure Delivery**

The Queensland Government has an opportunity to benchmark its infrastructure delivery approach against the successes and challenges of recent Olympic Games, including London, Tokyo, Paris, and Rio. By analysing how other host nations approached procurement, governance and legacy, the Queensland Government can streamline delivery, mitigate risks more effectively, and establish a global benchmark for Olympic infrastructure.

#### **A Fully Funded 2032 Games Enables a Smart and Flexible Procurement Strategy**

With venue infrastructure fully funded, the Queensland Government is uniquely placed to adopt a portfolio procurement approach that matches delivery models to project needs. By combining traditional contracts with collaborative models, the Queensland Government can balance the risks of cost, time, and quality across the delivery program.

#### **Government Oversight is Key to Delivering Transparency, Accountability and Legacy Outcomes**

Strong leadership and oversight from the Queensland Government will be essential to achieving the objectives set out in the Brisbane 2032 Delivery Plan and the 100 Day Review. A transparent governance framework will support delivery objectives of cost, time, and quality in a way that reinforces public confidence and helps ensure legacy outcomes are fully realised.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.	Introduction .....	4
1.1	Background.....	4
1.2	Context.....	5
1.3	Status.....	6
2.	State Initiatives.....	7
2.1	Queensland Budget 2025-26 .....	7
2.2	Destination 2045.....	7
3.	International Olympic Delivery Analysis .....	9
3.1	The 2024 Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games (Paris Games): A Case for Private Funding and Government Oversight .....	9
3.2	The 2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games (Tokyo Games): A Case for Engagement and Contingency Planning.....	10
3.3	The 2016 Rio Olympic and Paralympic Games (Rio Games): A Case Highlighting the Importance of Government Oversight .....	11
3.4	The 2012 London Olympic Games (London Games): A Case for Working Together .....	12
4.	Delivering Objectives Through Key Insights to Address Challenges.....	13
5.	Why K&L Gates?.....	15
	Key Contacts .....	15
	Footnotes.....	16



## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Background

The journey to secure the 2032 Games began in 2015, with a clear focus from the outset on accelerating infrastructure investment, boosting jobs and attracting tourism.<sup>1</sup> Following a lengthy process involving close collaboration between all levels of government and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Future Host Commission, a Final Submission was presented in May 2021. The Final Submission highlighted three key objectives, with the first listed being to accelerate the delivery of long-term plans essential for sustainable development across Queensland, highlighting that the 2032 Games is "a catalyst for compelling economic, social and environmental impacts and showcasing the liveability and vitality of Queensland."<sup>2</sup>

In November 2024, the Games Independent Infrastructure and Coordination Authority (GIICA) and its Board were appointed. Its critical task was to:

"Confirm that infrastructure projects are strategically chosen based on demand, ensuring they are located in the right places to meet the needs of the Games and support Queensland's long-term legacy outcomes ... within the agreed \$7.1 billion funding envelope from the State and Australian governments."<sup>3</sup>

Terms of Reference were established that required GIICA to achieve seven objectives during the review assessing deliverability, legacy impact, value for money and long-term strategies for social, community and economic growth.<sup>4</sup> However, what received relatively little attention was the discussion around delivery structures and procurement methodologies, which are critical to the success of these objectives and the project itself.

25 March 2025 marked a major milestone for Queensland. The 2032 Delivery Plan was released following 86 recommendations put forward by GIICA. For the first time, clarity was provided on which facilities will be utilised, which will be constructed, and which will undergo upgrades. While detailed costs were not available, the plan affirmed a fully funded infrastructure solution.<sup>5</sup> With much anticipation, the release of the Queensland State Government 2025-26 Budget (Queensland Budget) on 24 June 2025 revealed specific figures for the projects and perhaps concerningly, forecasted a deficit for Queensland.

Achieving value for money is now of the utmost importance, given that the budget forecasts a substantial deficit with some commentators estimating as much as AU\$8.6 billion.<sup>6</sup> Obviously, if ineffective delivery structures and procurement methods result in cost overruns, this will deepen the financial shortfall and cause reputational damage to Queensland, jeopardising the legacy that the 2032 Games was heralded to bring Queensland. This casts a spotlight on the urgent need for discussion regarding delivery structures and procurement methodologies to deliver an optimal result for Queensland.

Whilst value for money may be under scrutiny, Queensland's tourism focus is stronger than ever. This will be implemented through *Destination 2045: Delivering Queensland's Tourism Future* (Destination 2045) a 20-year tourism plan that extends well beyond the 2032 Games to harness and sustain the tourism boost it is expected to bring to Queensland.<sup>7</sup>

When combined with the state government's 100 Day Review and the 2032 Delivery Plan, Destination 2045 completes the full-circle strategy to fulfil the mission set in 2015 of accelerating infrastructure investment, boosting jobs and attracting tourism. If effective delivery structures and procurement methodologies for Olympic infrastructure can help achieve this plan, then this forward-thinking approach may generate the return of investment needed to address the current projected deficit, a model for future host cities around the world and a valuable learning that Queensland can share on the global stage.





## 1.2 Context

The 2032 Games represents a landmark commitment to significant infrastructure development in Queensland and Australia. With a fully funded infrastructure solution affirmed, minds turn to the broad range of delivery structures and procurement methodologies available to deliver an optimal result for the 2032 Games' infrastructure and legacy whilst achieving value for money.

This paper explores learnings from previous Olympic Games infrastructure delivery that may provide guidance for success in the planning and delivery of the 2032 Games. These learnings are provided in the context of the Queensland Government's recent announcement on 3 July 2025, that:<sup>8</sup>

- The Queensland and federal governments shook hands on a joint funding deal seeing AU\$3.435 billion contributed to the AU\$7.1 billion Games Venue Infrastructure Program which marks official commencement in venue delivery.
- Site investigations have commenced at Victoria Park for the new stadium and at the National Aquatic Centre site, aimed at informing the design and delivery of both major venues.
- Minor venue procurement has been launched at Logan Indoor Sports Centre, Moreton Bay Indoor Sports Centre, Barlow Park Stadium and Stadium Coast Stadium.
- Project validation work has been complete, which indicated to the Australian Government the projects can be delivered on time and on budget and will represent a good use of taxpayer dollars that benefits Queensland for decades to come.

While this paper will consider the major themes of delivery methods adopted since 2012, these must be considered in the context of two key trending issues:

- At the time of writing, the Paris 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games (Paris Games) provides the most recent point of reference for the planning and execution of the 2032 Games. With the Paris Games being the first game fully planned and delivered under the International Olympic Committee's (IOC) *Olympic Agenda 2020(+5)* and the New Norm, Paris established new benchmarks for future hosts.<sup>9</sup> A challenge for Queensland is to build on these advancements whilst navigating the ever-present issue of delivering Olympic infrastructure within budget and within stringent timelines.
- Led by the US, geopolitical trends and priorities are rapidly evolving. This may impact the themes, focus and approaches adopted in the delivery of the 2028 Los Angeles Olympic and Paralympic Games (Los Angeles Games), especially on the relative weight to be given to themes that may have had a larger focus for the Paris Games such as sustainability.<sup>10</sup> While it is too early to comment at this juncture, the opportunity for the Los Angeles Games to influence the future development of Olympic Games infrastructure may be significant.

Against this backdrop, Queensland has an opportunity to draw upon the lessons of the past to lead the next generation of Olympic infrastructure planning and delivery. Queensland is uniquely placed to lead the next evolution of Olympic infrastructure delivery, setting a benchmark in creating enduring public value and legacy outcomes, and showcasing Australia's capability on the global stage.



## 1.3 Status

The Queensland Government is strengthening the *Brisbane Olympic and Paralympic Games Arrangements Act 2021* (Qld) (BOPGA), through the *Planning (Social Impact and Community Benefit) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2025*. It was tabled by the committee on 24 June 2025 to Queensland Parliament and recommended to be passed.<sup>11</sup> It will allow the GIICA to override 15 existing planning laws, such as the *Environmental Protection Act 1994*, and reduce the total number of directors on the Brisbane 2032 Organising Committee Board from 24 to 15.<sup>12</sup> The aim of this amendment is to reduce bureaucracy and streamline the delivery of the 2032 Games so it can meet the time and budget constraints by mitigating potential delays due to legal barriers, and to ensure that there is a clear line of sight for project accountability.<sup>13</sup>

The amendment bill also proposes to establish the Games Venue and Legacy Delivery Authority as a statutory body under Queensland legislation, which will allow it to have independent control over its own funds, operate within a flexible structure with a focus on prioritising projects related to the Games, and subject it to the public sector accountability regime.<sup>14</sup>

Furthermore, a Games Leadership Group will also be established "to provide oversight and coordination of Games entities", which has been a key factor in the successful delivery of infrastructure in previous Olympic Games (see [Section 3](#) of the paper for details).

These steps reflect the Queensland Government's initiative-taking approach to reform and delivery efficiency. While public scrutiny is to be anticipated for any major infrastructure delivery program,<sup>15</sup> the measures taken aim to position Queensland for success in balancing time, cost, and quality outcomes.



## 2. State Initiatives

### 2.1 Queensland Budget 2025-26

The Queensland Government's commitment to the 2032 Games is reflected in the Queensland Budget, tasked with "delivering the foundation of a plan for Queensland's future and seizing the opportunity of the 2032 Games to invest in the generational infrastructure and transport connections needed for our growing population."<sup>16</sup>

Among the four key areas in the budget, the overarching theme of the budget centres on infrastructure and the 2032 Games, both of which work in tandem to support the overall objectives for Queensland.<sup>17</sup> In addition to specific Olympic venue allocations, the 2032 Games will benefit from the record infrastructure budget of AU\$116.8 billion.

Aligned with the objectives outlined in the 2032 Delivery Plan, the Budget delivers:

- AU\$7.1 billion over seven years to 2031-32 to be delivered as capital expenditure by GIICA, of which AU\$3.8 billion is provisioned for venues including the new main stadium at Victoria Park.<sup>18</sup>
- AU\$831.9 million over four years for Sunshine Coast Stadium, Sunshine Coast Mountain Bike Centre, Moreton Bay Indoor Sports Centre, Barlow Park Stadium, and Logan Indoor Sports Centre projects.<sup>19</sup>
- AU\$5.5 billion for *The Wave*, a seamless public transport from Brisbane to Sunshine Coast Airport including heavy passenger rail through Maroochydore CBD which will be home to new integrated athletes' village, arena, and cultural precinct.<sup>20</sup>
- AU\$9 billion committed through an 80:20 funding arrangement for upgrades to the Bruce Highway, a critical transport link that will enhance connectivity across the three key 2032 Games Zones: Brisbane, Sunshine Coast and Gold Coast.<sup>21</sup>

It appears this budget substantiates the claims that the "2032 Delivery Plan is not a sports allocation plan, but an infrastructure delivery plan."<sup>22</sup> However, the assertion that the GIICA "Board is acutely aware of its responsibility to ensure value for money in the cost of delivery"<sup>23</sup> will now be under scrutiny, given the forecasted AU\$8.6 billion operating deficit in FY26 and a threefold increase in government interest expenses.<sup>24</sup>

As Minister for Finance, Trade, Employment and Training, the Hon. Rosslyn Bates MP noted in her message accompanying the Queensland Budget, Queensland needs the infrastructure, but it must be delivered on time and at the best possible value.<sup>25</sup> Whilst the Minister identified that the Best Practice Industry Conditions were driving up costs and that the current tendering processes lack competitiveness, we similarly recognise that construction and procurement methods play a critical role in achieving value for money.

### 2.2 Destination 2045

Part of achieving value for money is having a forward-thinking plan that capitalises on the 2032 Games. *Destination 2045: Delivering Queensland's Tourism Future* is the embodiment of that vision.

The Queensland Budget deficit is not without justification. It not only addresses the needs of Queensland today and for the 2032 Games but also invests in a long-term vision for 2045 aimed at strengthening the state's tourism future. With a committed AU\$446 million over four years to support Destination 2045, the plan is looking to have tangible backing for the clear outcomes defined in the plan, including:<sup>26</sup>

- Double visitor expenditure from AU\$42 billion to AU\$84 billion by 2045.
- Deliver 45 new ecotourism experiences by 2045 with the Whitsunday Skyway project being the foundation of Queensland's 45 by 45 vision.
- Increase direct tourism-supported jobs from 156,000 to 190,000.
- Leverage the global momentum of the 2032 Games.
- Cement Queensland as a global leader in ecotourism and world-class visitor experiences.



Additional funding for aviation attraction, event attraction and new product development and further supplementation for Tourism and Events Queensland brings the government's total investment to AU\$1 billion over four years, lining up with the agendas of Destination 2045.<sup>27</sup>

Hosting the 2032 Games is the most significant boost to tourism since Expo '88 and is expected to generate an AU\$4.6 billion boost to tourism and trade.<sup>28</sup> Should these outcomes be delivered; the Queensland Budget deficit will be viewed as a well-timed investment. However, to fully realise this value, adopting efficient and innovative construction and procurement methods for the 2032 games is critical.

These methods are essential not only for the success of the 2032 Games but also to ensure visitors leave Queensland with a positive impression of the infrastructure and the 2032 venues. This will encourage them to return, spread the word, and firmly establish Queensland as a premier tourism destination. Otherwise, the 2032 Games risk becoming a wasted opportunity and a catalyst to growth that never materialised.

In essence, failure to manage these risks effectively may undermine the expected economic benefits and compromise the broader outcomes that infrastructure investment aims to achieve. Effective construction and procurement methods could make or break the success of the 2032 Games as demonstrated by Olympic and Paralympic Games that have come before.





## 3. International Olympic Delivery Analysis

### 3.1 The 2024 Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games (Paris Games): A Case for Private Funding and Government Oversight

#### Procurement Narrative

The Paris Games employed the use of public private partnerships (PPPs) in its infrastructure delivery. Paris accredited its success in part to a highly collaborative governance model, supported by key private sector partnerships.<sup>29</sup> A key element in this approach was the formation of Solideo (Société de Livraison des Ouvrages Olympiques), the dedicated Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA). Solideo was tasked with ensuring that projects were delivered on time, within budget, and according to plan. It oversaw 69 projects while adopting a methodology focused on utilising "the Games-related contracts [to] benefit the entire economic fabric and all businesses, especially SMEs and SSE organisations".<sup>30</sup> Queensland has an aligned vision, with a mission statement emphasising opportunities for "Queensland businesses to grow, win more work, and showcase the best that our state has to offer".<sup>31</sup>

#### Outcomes

The Paris Games were procured in the face of growing scepticism regarding the financial over-spend and related risks posed to host nations.<sup>32</sup> However, Paris successfully challenged this scepticism by becoming the first Olympic Games since Sydney in 2000 to be delivered for under US\$10 billion<sup>33</sup> (approximately AU\$16 billion) and allegedly finished with a surplus of at least €26.8 million (approximately AU\$48 million) as reported by the Paris 2024 committee.<sup>34</sup>

This financial outcome was achieved while still meeting ambitious sustainability and legacy goals, including 100% renewable energy use, a 50% reduction in carbon emissions, and a 90% event circularity rate.<sup>35</sup> These accomplishments position the Paris Games as a helpful benchmark for Queensland Government to consider if endeavouring to host a 'a sustainable and climate positive Games'.<sup>36</sup>

In line with its mission, Paris prioritised building infrastructure to address the long-term needs of the local population. Similarly, Queensland has emphasised that the Games will serve as "a golden platform to deliver what's needed for Queensland's future", particularly in areas such as transport, infrastructure, tourism and grassroots sporting facilities.<sup>37</sup> Accordingly, several major transport projects that are currently in either planning or in the delivery phases have been accelerated.<sup>38</sup>

#### Key Insights for the 2032 Games

Notwithstanding its use of PPP models that may have less applicability for a fully funded *Delivery Plan*, a key insight that can be extracted from the Paris approach centres on the adoption of a shared transparent strategy with open dialogue between government and industry.



## 3.2 The 2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games (Tokyo Games): A Case for Engagement and Contingency Planning

### Procurement Narrative

The Tokyo Games used traditional hard-risk procurement methods. The main Olympic Stadium was a design and build arrangement with architect Kengo Kuma and design firm Azua Sekkei Co and building firm Taisei Corp.<sup>39</sup> The original design was abandoned amid mounting cost concerns, although despite the change of approach the stadium was delivered in time for the Tokyo Games.<sup>40</sup>

### Outcomes

The Tokyo Games set the record for the most public engagement of any Olympic Games to date, where three in four people had reportedly followed the Games and totalled over three billion in broadcast audience, 28 billion in video views on Olympic broadcast partners' platforms (a 139% increase compared to the Rio Games) and over six billion in engagements with Olympic social media handles.<sup>41</sup> Tokyo may have owed such success in part to the development of the IOC's digital strategy, the use of technological and digital innovations (which was particularly significant for improving global engagement)<sup>42</sup> and the implementation of the Tokyo 2020 Participation Programme, which was the Tokyo 2020 Organising Committee's plan to actively engage the public pre-Games.<sup>43</sup> As further explored in the comments regarding the Rio Games, public engagement appears to have been a factor in the successful delivery of legacy promises.

The success of the Tokyo 2020 Participation Programme helped deliver a legacy of increased sports participation in Tokyo (from 39% in 2007 to 69% in 2021), which was also supported by the reopening of temporary Olympic stadiums for public use post-Games.<sup>44</sup> This success provides helpful guidance for Queensland in strategies to create engagement pre-Games and repurpose Olympic infrastructure post-Games to help deliver long-term benefits, especially in terms of social benefits and improved public amenities.

The Tokyo Games developed contingency plans to facilitate the Games to progress safely and smoothly despite the effects of COVID-19. The Tokyo Games' contingency planning involved identifying potential risks of contracting the virus and creating guidelines to help align partners to adhere to these plans and countermeasures. Such countermeasures were implemented effectively through creating and providing playbooks and briefings to partners and athletes which had helped in facilitating vaccinations and running test events to assess the efficacy of those plans.<sup>45</sup>

The Tokyo Games was also the first Olympic Games to reuse and redevelop old structures for its Olympic infrastructure.<sup>46</sup> This infrastructure recycling assisted the Tokyo Games in achieving its sustainability goals, helping keep costs down while taking steps to ensure the protection of existing heritage sites.

### Key Insights for the 2032 Games

The Tokyo Games demonstrated that design and construct procurement models can be successfully used to deliver Olympic infrastructure, particularly with government oversight to ensure the reasonableness of the solution within the time, cost, and quality constraints of the development. In this case, early involvement of the private sector was key in being able to firstly recognise the cost constraint of the initial design, and then to being able to achieve the final stadium infrastructure delivery.

The Tokyo Games also illustrated the importance of venue and people management in delivering a global event during a pandemic. In this case, the provision of strict guidelines, support, instructions, and resources played an important role that may be considered for future Olympic Games to manage health risks.

The Tokyo Games also provides an excellent reference for the 2032 Games in terms of approaches to sustainability and the repurposing of existing infrastructure. Encouragingly, 12 out of 19 venue projects for the 2032 Games involve the upgrade of existing infrastructure, an approach aligning with global best practice in sustainability and cost efficiency, as demonstrated by Tokyo. This infrastructure recycling will help the 2032 Games achieve its sustainability goals and enhance the prospects of timely venue delivery within the budget.<sup>47</sup>



## 3.3 The 2016 Rio Olympic and Paralympic Games (Rio Games): A Case Highlighting the Importance of Government Oversight

### Procurement Narrative

Where the Paris Games showcased the power of PPPs, the Rio Games highlighted the risks of the strategy. The Rio Games used PPPs as a funding solution where approximately 57% of the nearly 40 billion Reais (approximately AU\$11.3 billion) spend came from the private sector.<sup>48</sup> Even though the IOC has welcomed the use of PPPs to reduce the cost of the Games for host nations, they had also highlighted the need for the Rio Games Organising Committee to closely monitor private sector participants who may be at risk of prioritising their own commercial interests at the cost of the time, cost and quality outcomes sought for the infrastructure delivery.

### Outcomes

The IOC's concerns were not unreasonable. The local organising committee, Rio 2016, was operating under significant financial strain, adversely impacting its ability to deliver the projects to IOC's standards. These cost impacts led to electricity and water being improperly tested at the Olympic Village, which resulted in several countries (including Australia) expressing concerns that the housing was 'not safe or ready'.<sup>49</sup>

Budget cuts were a key factor impacting the delivery of legacy outcomes for the Rio Games.<sup>50</sup> The original legacy aim for urban revitalization agenda (a plan involving improved access to the city and urban infrastructure) was defunded, with funding redirected to compensate the families who had to be evicted to make room for the new venues.<sup>51</sup>

Despite the budget cuts, the Rio Games still exceeded their budget by at least 51%.<sup>52</sup> The major expenses of the Rio Games included: building the venues, a new subway line, a doping laboratory, a renovated port, and facilitating a cleanup of Guanabara Bay. Additionally, there was also the renovation of a historic district which costed over US\$4 billion (approximately AU\$6.1 billion).<sup>53</sup>

### Key Insights for the 2032 Games

The reliance on the private sector without adequate government oversight led to Olympic infrastructure that failed to meet the cost and quality requirements (including legacy outcomes) that were sought. The 2032 Games have the benefit of being fully funded by government, which is likely to decrease the risk of some of the issues faced by the Rio Games. However, key insights that may assist include the importance for government to set clear objectives and have active oversight to help ensure that planned delivery outcomes achieve the cost, time, and quality (including legacy) outcomes sought.

The Rio Games also highlighted the importance of public engagement for delivering legacy outcomes. The Rio Games suffered low domestic audience support and ticket sale revenue, impacting financial outcomes and the ability to deliver legacy promises.<sup>54</sup> A key insight for the Queensland Government will be the importance of engaging early with domestic and international audiences to support the 2032 Games which will help ensure that legacy outcomes can be supported.



## 3.4 The 2012 London Olympic Games (London Games): A Case for Working Together

### Procurement Narrative

The London Games employed a unique Delivery Partner Model (DPM) where the UK's ODA, a government-funded Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) who was tasked with the construction of the venues and infrastructure required to host the games, engaged a delivery partner from the private sector, CLM Consortium.<sup>55</sup> Under this model, the ODA was responsible for setting the strategy and funding while CLM Consortium, as the delivery partner, was responsible for developing the required packages of work, managing timelines and budgets and supervising the contractors engaged.<sup>56</sup>

### Outcomes

Through the DPM, the UK's ODA was successful in delivering the Olympic and Paralympic venues and the necessary transport infrastructure to the agreed time, design and building specification and budget, devising transport plans, and assisting the London Development Agency in the finalisation of sustainable legacy plans.

The structure of the ODA provided it with autonomy to implement its delivery program and organisational and governance structures independent of external political influences (see *London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006*).<sup>57</sup> Such flexibility allowed it to appoint an independent body, the Commission for a Sustainable London 2012, who was responsible for 'monitoring the delivery of a sustainable Olympics and Paralympics and providing an assurance process to ensure that sustainability objectives, targets, and aspirations were being met'.<sup>58</sup> Through the employment of the Commission, the London Games largely met or exceeded each of its sustainability objectives, including reducing onsite carbon emissions by 48% (extending to 59% including offsite measures), deriving 10.8% of the energy used from renewable sources, diverting 90% of waste from landfill, using 34% recycled content by value in materials and reducing the volume of potable water by 60%.<sup>59</sup>

However, legacy outcomes of the London Games have drawn criticism in that affordable housing, which was a central element to London's bid, was never delivered. Out of the 12,400 homes that have been built around the Olympic site, only about 1,000 are affordable housing.<sup>60</sup> This criticism is one that may draw particular focus for the 2032 Games, noting that during the *100 Day Review* public submissions proposed the conversion of Athletes Villages to affordable housing post-Games, opening an opportunity, if managed, for the 2032 Games to achieve what the London Games could not.<sup>61</sup>

### Key Insights for the 2032 Games

The principle to extract here, much like with Paris, is shaping and defining the shared vision principles. The London Games owed much of its success to its DPM, particularly in how the model enabled the ODA to establish a clear delivery strategy, maintain a high level of transparency, create a clear definition of the scope, and achieve a focused delivery. The advantage of the DPM was that it allowed the ODA to have flexibility and agility in responding to the different skills required at different stages of the delivery programme, which underpinned the London Games' success in the delivery of its objectives.<sup>62</sup>

A parallel may be drawn between the ODA of the London Games and the GIICA of the 2032 Games, where both delivery committees are empowered by specialised legislation that was amended to emphasise greater efficiency and agility. The London Games highlighted how the additional autonomy and flexibility granted by legislation assisted successful delivery of the Olympic Games. This benchmark offers strong support for the Queensland Government's legislative reforms, highlighting how the new amendments to BOPGA may similarly contribute positively to the achievement of delivery objectives.





## 4. Delivering Objectives Through Key Insights to Address Challenges

Key objectives, constraints, and proposed methods for addressing them based upon procurement narratives from past Olympic Games infrastructure are identified below.

Topic	Key Objectives	Strategic Challenges	Procurement Narratives from Past Olympic Games That May Assist
<b>Cost</b>	Deliver the Games within the funding envelope.	The proposed budget for the 2032 Games is modest relative to recent Games. <sup>63</sup> Inflation and the ambitious scope of the 2032 <i>Delivery Plan</i> highlight the importance of disciplined financial management.	Draw on delivery narratives from London 2012, where a collaborative model helped align incentives and manage costs.
	Relieve cost pressure while maintaining project control.	Cost efficiency must be achieved without compromising delivery timing or scope or losing control over delivery outcomes to the private sector.	Apply lessons from Paris 2024, where strong oversight accompanied private sector involvement. Beware of over-reliance on the private sector as in Rio 2016, where budget and quality issues were experienced.
<b>Time</b>	Deliver Games infrastructure within the required timeframe.	Approximately seven years remain before the 2032 Games. <sup>64</sup> Labour shortages, procurement constraints, and industry productivity challenges increase delivery risk.	Apply early contractor involvement, as seen in Tokyo 2020, to enable concurrent design, buildability input and delivery.
	Pre-empt and manage delivery risks.	The geopolitical environment is evolving daily. Global and local disruptions could delay projects and compound risks.	Adopt flexible delivery models backed by enabling legislation (London 2012; GIIICA). Embed contingency planning and response frameworks, as used in Tokyo 2020.
<b>Quality</b>	Ensure legacy goals (including affordable housing) are achieved.	Rising property prices make post-Games affordability difficult. This challenge was also seen in the wake of London 2012, which struggled to meet initial affordable housing targets. <sup>65</sup>	Establish a dedicated legacy delivery authority to oversee the post-games transition (London 2012). Start planning early and ensure sustained coordination, avoiding the challenges from Rio 2016.
	Maintain public engagement and maximise long-term social benefits.	Without public momentum, legacy programs risk being underfunded or deprioritised post-Games.	Launch pre-Games engagement initiatives and leverage digital channels to build support. Tokyo 2020 succeeded in maintaining



Topic	Key Objectives	Strategic Challenges	Procurement Narratives from Past Olympic Games That May Assist
	Maintain alignment across delivery entities and tiers of government.	Multiple delivery bodies and layers of government increase the risk of fragmentation, delays, and misaligned objectives.	<p>community momentum despite pandemic restrictions.</p> <p>Establish a central coordinating authority with strong oversight powers (e.g. Solideo in Paris 2024; or ODA in London 2012). Use whole-of-government governance and reporting to ensure consistency, accountability and streamlined delivery.</p>

## 5. Why K&L Gates?

K&L Gates offers a unique combination of global reach and local depth that sets it apart from other law firms. With an integrated international platform spanning 48 offices around the world, and a strong on-the-ground presence in Brisbane, we provide legal expertise across the full project lifecycle.

Our teams bring substantial experience in major infrastructure and procurement, combined with commercial focus, and a collaborative style that clients value. We understand how projects get delivered. For the 2032 Games, this means practical, globally informed advice that helps government and industry deliver the infrastructure needed and associated legacy outcomes with confidence.

### Key Contacts



**Justin O'Callaghan**

Partner, Real Estate  
Brisbane

+61 7 3233 1289

+61 447 600 824

[Justin.O'Callaghan@klgates.com](mailto:Justin.O'Callaghan@klgates.com)



**Tom Young**

Partner, Corporate  
Brisbane

+61 7 3233 1266

+61 416 131 543

[Tom.Young@klgates.com](mailto:Tom.Young@klgates.com)



**Deborah Bean**

Partner, Finance  
Brisbane

+61 7 3233 1238

+61 420 436 784

[Deborah.Bean@klgates.com](mailto:Deborah.Bean@klgates.com)



## Footnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Queensland Government, *About the Games* (Web Page) <<https://www.qld.gov.au/about/brisbane2032/about-the-games>>.
- <sup>2</sup> International Olympic Committee, *IOC Future Host Commission Questionnaire Response* (Final Submission, May 2021) 4.
- <sup>3</sup> Games Independent Infrastructure and Coordination Authority, *100 Day Review: Brisbane 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games Infrastructure* (Report, 8 March 2025) 8 ('100 Day Review').
- <sup>4</sup> Queensland Government, *100-day Review of Brisbane 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games Infrastructure* (Terms of Reference, November 2024) 1.
- <sup>5</sup> *100 Day Review* (n 3) 10.
- <sup>6</sup> Create Advisory, *2025 Queensland Budget Insights* (Report, June 2025) 2 ('Budget Insights').
- <sup>7</sup> Queensland Government, *Destination 2045* (Strategic Plan, 2 June 2025) ('Destination 2045').
- <sup>8</sup> Catherine King et al, '2032 Games Infrastructure Funding Deal Confirmed' (Media Release, Queensland Government 3 July 2025) <<https://minister.infrastructure.gov.au/c-king/media-release/2032-games-infrastructure-funding-deal-confirmed#:~:text=The%20Australian%20Government%20has%20today%20announced%20that%20their,Paralympic%20infrastructure%20is%20delivered%20for%202032%20and%20beyond.>>>.
- <sup>9</sup> International Olympic Committee, *IOC Final Report on Paris 2024* (Final Report, 16 January 2025) 3 ('Paris Report').
- <sup>10</sup> Michael Phillis, Alexa St. John and Jack Brook, 'A breakdown of major EPA deregulatory moves around water, air, climate', *The Associated Press* (online, 13 March 2025) <<https://apnews.com/article/epa-zeldin-deregulation-plans-list-actions-5fb7fc1d24f54f193d585643c8fba79f>>.
- <sup>11</sup> State Development, Infrastructure and Works Committee, Parliament of Queensland, *Planning (Social Impact and Community benefit) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2025* (Report No 8, June 2025).
- <sup>12</sup> Jack McKay, 'Government to introduce bill that will override 15 planning laws for 2032 Olympic venue', *ABC News* (online, 1 May 2025) <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-05-01/qld-parliament-to-override-planning-laws-2032-olympic-venues/105236370>>; Jarrod Bleijie and Tim Mander, 'Games laws to deliver 2032 and beyond' (Joint Media Statement, Queensland Government, 01 May 2025) [4], [19].
- <sup>13</sup> Bleijie and Mander (n 12) [5], [9], [20].
- <sup>14</sup> Housing, Big Build and Manufacturing Committee, Parliament of Queensland, *Brisbane Olympic and Paralympic Games Arrangements Amendment Bill 2024* (Report No 9, 17 May 2024) 4.
- <sup>15</sup> McKay (n 12).
- <sup>16</sup> Queensland Government, *2025-26 Queensland Budget, Budget Overview* (Report, 24 June 2025) 6 ('Budget Overview').
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid* 8.
- <sup>18</sup> Queensland Government, *2025-26 Queensland Budget, Budget Measures* (Report, 24 June 2025) 47 ('Budget Measures').
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid*.





<sup>20</sup> *Budget Overview* (n 16) 5.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid* 8.

<sup>22</sup> Department of the Premier and Cabinet, State of Queensland, *2032 Delivery Plan* (Report, March 2025) 4 ('*Delivery Plan*').

<sup>23</sup> *100 Day Review* (n 3) 6.

<sup>24</sup> *Budget Insights* (n 6) 2.

<sup>25</sup> *Budget Overview* (n 16) 7.

<sup>26</sup> *Budget Measures* (n 18) 51; *Destination 2045* (n 7).

<sup>27</sup> *Budget Measures* (n 18) 51.

<sup>28</sup> *Destination 2045* (n 7) 7.

<sup>29</sup> *Paris Report* (n 9) 3.

<sup>30</sup> Paris 2024, *The Paris 2024 Olympic Games in Review* (Press Kit, December 2024) 67 ('*Paris Games Review*').

<sup>31</sup> Queensland Government, *Q2032 Procurement Strategy* (Policy Report, July 2023) 5 ('*Q2032 Strategy*').

<sup>32</sup> Alexander Budzier and Bent Flyvbjerg, *The Oxford Olympics Study 2024: Are Cost and Cost Overrun at the Games Coming Down?* (Research Paper, July 2024) 3.

<sup>33</sup> Alicia Wallace and Alex Leeds Matthews, 'Hosting the Olympics has become financially untenable, economists say', *CNN Business* (online, 19 August 2024) [5]  
<<https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/26/economy/olympics-economics-paris-2024/index.html>>.

<sup>34</sup> *Paris Games Review* (n 30) 7.

<sup>35</sup> Paris 2024, *Paris 2024 Sustainability & Legacy Post-Games Report Summary* (Report Summary, December 2024) 5. However, note Alexander Budzier and Bent Flyvbjerg, *The Oxford Olympics Study 2024: Are Cost and Cost Overrun at the Games Coming Down?* (Research Paper, July 2024) 9, that all Games with available data exhibit cost overruns.

<sup>36</sup> *Q2032 Strategy* (n 31) 3.

<sup>37</sup> *Delivery Plan* (n 22) 4.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid* 11.

<sup>39</sup> Duncan Mackay, 'Construction work on Olympic Stadium for Tokyo 2020 completed', *Inside the Games* (online, 19 November 2019) [2] <<https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1087204/olympic-stadium-for-tokyo-2020-completed>>.

<sup>40</sup> Michael Hincks, 'Take a look inside Tokyo 2020's recently completed National Stadium', *International Olympic Committee* (online, 2 December 2019) <<https://www.olympics.com/en/news/inside-tokyo-2020-national-stadium-completed-summer-olympic-games>>.

<sup>41</sup> International Olympic Committee, *Tokyo 2020 Audience & Insights Report* (Report, December 2021) 3-6.

<sup>42</sup> International Olympic Committee, 'Innovation, engagement and digital transformation: Why Tokyo 2020 marked a new era for the Olympic Games' (online, 20 April 2022)  
<<https://www.olympics.com/ioc/news/innovation-engagement-and-digital-transformation>>.



- <sup>43</sup> Tokyo 2020 and Tokyo 2020 Paralympic Games, *Tokyo 2020 Guidebook* (Report, July 2021) 22.
- <sup>44</sup> International Olympic Committee, *Report of the Coordination Commission for the Games of the XXXII Olympiad Tokyo 2020* (Report, 2022) 27, 29 ('Tokyo Games Report').
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid 15-16.
- <sup>46</sup> International Olympic Committee, 'All you need to know about Tokyo 2020 sustainability' (online, 22 July 2021) <https://www.olympics.com/ioc/news/all-you-need-to-know-about-tokyo-2020-sustainability>.
- <sup>47</sup> *Delivery Plan* (n 22) 16-22.
- <sup>48</sup> Stephen Eisenhammer, 'IOC warned Rio on construction contracts five years ago: documents', *Reuters* (online, 29 July 2016) [3] <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/ioc-warned-rio-on-construction-contracts-five-years-ago-documents-idUSKCN1082MQ/>.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid [4].
- <sup>50</sup> Meg Healy, 'Life after the Olympics: Housing in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil', *Edge Effects* (online, 8 August 2021) <https://edgeeffects.net/olympic-legacies/>.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>52</sup> Joe Leahy, 'Brazil's Olympic costs running 51% over budget, report warns', *Financial Times* (online, 7 July 2016) <https://www.ft.com/content/ef122cb6-43d6-11e6-864d-01c0167ff470>; Budzier and Flyvbjerg (n 11) 10.
- <sup>53</sup> Leahy (n 52).
- <sup>54</sup> Eisenhammer (n 48); Healy (n 50).
- <sup>55</sup> Dennis Hone et al, 'Delivering London 2012: organisation and programme' (2011) 164(5) *Proceeding of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Civil Engineering* 5.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid 9.
- <sup>57</sup> Global Infrastructure Hub, *London 2012 Olympics sustainable London* (Case Study, 16 October 2021).
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>59</sup> Commission for a Sustainable London 2012, *Making a Difference* (Post-Games Report, March 2013).
- <sup>60</sup> Raúl Daffunchio Picazo, 'London 2012: The affordable homes that never came', *Inside the Games* (online, 27 March 2024) [9] <https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1144416/london-2012-affordable-homes-never-came>.
- <sup>61</sup> *100 Day Review* (n 3) 136.
- <sup>62</sup> Hone (n 55) 12.
- <sup>63</sup> Bent Flyvberg, Allison Stewart and Alexander Budzier, *The Oxford Olympics Study 2016: Cost and Cost Overrun at the Games* (Research Paper, July 2016).
- <sup>64</sup> *Delivery Plan* (n 22) 7.
- <sup>65</sup> Picazo (n 60).



# K&L GATES

K&L Gates is a fully integrated global law firm with lawyers located across five continents. The firm represents leading multinational corporations, growth and middle-market companies, capital markets participants and entrepreneurs in every major industry group as well as public sector entities, educational institutions, philanthropic organizations and individuals. For more information about K&L Gates or its locations, practices and registrations, visit [www.klgates.com](http://www.klgates.com).

This publication is for informational purposes and does not contain or convey legal advice. The information herein should not be used or relied upon in regard to any particular facts or circumstances without first consulting a lawyer.

©2025 K&L Gates LLP. All Rights Reserved.

